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THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND HISPANIC AMERICA[1]

The Monroe Doctrine has been for the American continent at once the most powerful unifying force and the greatest cause of division and misunderstanding. From the standpoint of the United States it might be called "the American fetish". Along with the Washington Doctrine of no entangling alliances it has been the cardinal principle of our foreign policy. As Jefferson said, "It is the offspring of the American Revolution and the most momentous question offered to my contemplation since the Independence". Like many an important principle, it has through the passage of time come to be more of a sentiment than a principle or a policy. And like every sentiment it has as many interpretations as there are kinds of persons who deal with it. To the average North American it means the divine right—as sacred and clear as was ever such right to any monarch—to act as the big brother of all the other American nations. This means first to protect them from all outside interference and, second, to help them in their own difficulties when they seem to have lost their way politically, financially or economically. It makes no difference what question concerning Hispanic America may arise in this country or what difficulty may arise in the south which affects the life of the United States, many immediately call out the Monroe Doctrine as arbiter.

"Why has General Crowder gone to Cuba?" was the question recently appearing from a reader of one of our prominent dailies. "It is due to the Monroe Doctrine, which makes us responsible for fair elections in Cuba," answered the all-wise editor. And no doubt the questioner was entirely satisfied with this simple answer. Because we North Americans are so sure of our generous desire to help all who are in need and so sure of our superiority to all the rest of America, many of us suppose that all Hispanic

[1] This paper is chapter V. of a forthcoming volume entitled *Problems in Pan Americanism.*

American government must be highly appreciative of the help which the Monroe Doctrine makes us in honor bound to give. Of course if the young sinner proves recalcitrant, we, as the unselfish and more experienced brother, desirous only of the other's improvement, must compel him to be good. If anyone questions at all whether this is the right procedure he is met with "We do not discuss the Monroe Doctrine, we enforce it".

It is this attitude of the North American toward the Doctrine, rather than the Doctrine itself, that explains why it has been such a cause of division and misunderstanding. In other words it is a certain interpretation of the Doctrine (a false interpretation, I believe) and not the Doctrine itself, that is so much opposed in Hispanic America. Indeed the original Monroe Doctrine was well received in the south, and from that time until today the declaration in its original sense has been approved by the best minds of Hispanic America.

In these days when all international relations are in flux and when every principle of life is being stripped of its accretions and thoroughly examined, we need a fresh study of the original purposes of the Doctrine which has been the basis of more discussion and more varied interpretation than any other document ever issued by the president of a republic.

ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE

The substance of this doctrine, which calls for the exclusion of European colonization and interference in American affairs, had often been stated before the Monroe pronouncement both by North American and South American statesmen. But in 1822, it seemed probable that the efforts of the Holy Alliance to strangle all democratic development in Europe might be extended to the western hemisphere. So Monroe and his advisors felt it necessary to take steps to forestall any such movement. Great Britain was also opposed to the extension of the influence of the Holy Alliance to America, for with the reconquest of Spanish America a large part of the conquered territory might be turned over to France and the large commerce which had been diverted to Great Britain on account of the revolt of the colonies would be seriously affected.

At this time the British Foreign Secretary was the celebrated Canning, one of the most astute men that ever held that office, a man who exercised almost a charmed influence over Hispanic American statesmen of those days, as well as an exaggerated place in the judgments of later Hispanic American historians. His proposal to the United States of an agreement that would checkmate the influence of the Alliance (and incidentally that of the United States) in Hispanic America, has led many historians to erroneously credit him with originating the Monroe Doctrine. At least two strong proofs of the falsity of the "Canning myth", as it has rightly been called, are these: First, the doctrine that Europe must not meddle in American affairs had been stated many times both in North and South America, before it was formally announced by Monroe. Second, the Doctrine had no more strenous opponent than Canning himself. He later said:

> It is not easy to say how much the previous British propositions influenced the message, but the doctrine, if such it can be called, of the presidential message prohibiting all future colonization on the American continent, is absolutely unacceptable to my government and to France. This extraordinary principle will be combated by my government with all its force.

The private correspondence of Canning with some of his friends shows that he did everything possible to combat the Doctrine. In fact, Great Britain has generally been a strong opponent, Lord Salisbury writing to Secretary Olney during the Venezuela controversy that the Monroe Doctrine was not entitled to anyone's respect.

When Canning was asked why he had not sought to prevent the French invasion of Spain, he said:

> I sought for compensation in another hemisphere. I resolved that if France had Spain it should not be Spain with the Indies; I called the new world into existence to redress the balance of the old.

This, of course, was nonsense, as the Spanish American colonies had won their independence by their own efforts and had been recognized by the United States as independent govern-

ments two years before Great Britain took any action in the matter. Canning was so irritated by the Monroe Doctrine that he did not permit the United States to participate with Great Britain and Russia in the settlement of the Alaska boundary question. As long as he remained in public life he opposed the Monroe Doctrine in every possible way, and continually impressed upon the Hispanic American republics the advantage to them of an alliance with Great Britain over an alliance with the United States.

And yet, with all this evidence to the contrary, great students like Alberdi have believed this Canning myth and attribute the success of the colonies' struggle for independence to the friendship of Great Britain. Many Hispanic Americans erroneously hold this to be a very important point in showing what they claim was the indifference of the United States to Hispanic America's struggle for independence.

Canning did send to Minister Rush of the United States, who was in London at the time, five proposals concerning the recognition of the independence of the Spanish colonies and their protection from the schemes of the Holy Alliance, which he suggested the two governments might jointly announce. But Monroe, advised by his Secretary, Adams, chose rather to announce a purely American doctrine that would be sustained by American authority. This is a most important matter for Hispanic Americans to understand. And for North America it is imperative to realize that the circumstances surrounding the announcement of the Doctrine all point to the fact that our statesmen did not have the least idea that we were providing for ourselves any special privileges in America. As John Quincy Adams, the man who historians believed worded the Doctrine itself, wrote in his diary:

> Considering the South Americans as independent nations, they themselves, and no other nation had the right to dispose of their condition. *We* have no right to dispose of them, either alone or in conjunction with other nations. Neither have any other nations the right to dispose of them without their consent.

The most salient features of the famous Doctrine, which was contained in President Monroe's annual message to Congress on December 2, 1823, are the following:

The occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power.

The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments. And to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence, and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed, by force, in the

internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers whose Governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States.[2]

HOW THE DOCTRINE WAS RECEIVED IN HISPANIC AMERICA

What was Hispanic America's attitude to this new doctrine? Bolivar seems not to have heard of it for quite a while. He never really made any long pronouncement upon it. He did, however, applaud the declaration, and in a letter to the Spanish general whom he was endeavoring to persuade to join the liberal cause, said:

> England and the United States protect us. These two nations, which form today the only two powers in the world, will not permit that help be given to Spain.

The Brazilian government, through its minister, Rebello, proposed an alliance between the United States and Brazil which the other Hispanic American republics were invited to join. That government invoked the message of Monroe and the necessity of making impossible any tendency of the mother countries to reconquer their old colonies, observing that

> the United States is obliged to place in practice the principle announced in the message (Monroe) giving proof of the generosity and the consistency which animates that government, without counting the eventual sacrifice of men and money.[3]

On April 6, 1824, Vice-President Santander sent a message to the Colombian Congress in which he referred to the Monroe Doctrine as follows:

> The President of the United States has lately signalized his administration by an act eminently just and worthy of the classic land of liberty; and in his last message to the Congress he has declared that he will regard every interference of any European power directed to op-

[2] James Daniel Richardson, *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, pp. 778, 786–788.

[3] Helio Lobo, *Causas Diplomaticas*.

press or violate the destinies of the independent governments of America as a manifestation of hostile disposition toward the United States. That Government considers every attempt on the part of the Allied Powers to extend their system to any portion of the American hemisphere as perilous to the peace and safety of the United States. This policy, consolatory to human nature, would secure to Colombia a powerful ally should its independence and liberty be menaced by the Allied Powers. As the Executive cannot regard with indifference the march which the policy of the United States has taken, it is sedulously occupied in reducing the question to decisive and conclusive points.

About the same time Santander addressed a note to Secretary Adams in which he said:

My Government has received with the greatest pleasure the message, worthy of its author, which expresses the sentiment of the country over which he presides.

He even went so far as to propose an alliance between the United States and Colombia to sustain the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.

From Buenos Aires United States Minister Rodney wrote on February 10, 1824, to President Monroe that his message had been received two days before, that it had inspired the Argentine people, and that it would have the "happiest effect throughout the whole Spanish provinces". On May 22nd he wrote Secretary Adams that the frank and firm message of the President had been productive of happy effects; but that he looked not so much to its temporary influence as to its permanent operation. "We had it immediately translated", he wrote, "into the Spanish language, printed and generally circulated in this quarter, Peru and Chile."

On December 16, 1824, the congress of the United Provinces of Río de la Plata opened its sessions at Buenos Aires. In a message of the government of Buenos Aires, laid before that body on the same date, the American policy of the United States was referred to in the following terms:

We have fulfilled a great national duty toward the republic of the United States of North America. That republic, which, from its origin,

presides over the civilization of the New World, has solemnly acknowledged our independence. It has at the same time made an appeal to our national honor by supposing us capable of contending single-handed with Spain; but it has constituted itself the guardian of the field of battle in order to prevent any foreign assistance from being introduced to the aid of our rival.

Governor Las Heras, of Buenos Aires, on receiving United States Minister Forbes a little later, said:

The Governor of the United Provinces recognizes the importance of the two principles which the president of the United States has announced in his message to Congress and, convinced of the usefulness of their adoption by each of the states of this continent, will consider it his duty to back them, and for this purpose will accept any opportunity that is presented.

Chile gave a most genuine response to President Monroe's message. The papers of Santiago seemed to discover in the Monroe Doctrine a frank and explicit promise of effective protection for the Spanish American republics against the political combinations and military projects of European monarchs. A delegate of the chief executive, upon the occasion of receiving Mr. Allen, the newly-appointed Minister of the United States to Chile, expressed the gratitude of his government for the recognition of the independence of the new states and for the recent declaration of President Monroe which placed them beyond the reach of the coalitions of European monarchs.

The cordial declarations of the Foreign Office of the Central American Government in 1825, also heartily approved the Doctrine.[4]

It would be easy to present other indorsements of the Monroe Doctrine by the Hispanic American countries in those early days, but these are sufficient to show that at that time they had no idea of anything being involved in the doctrine which made it dangerous to Hispanic America. It will be remembered that in the call for the Panama Congress it was proposed to make the

[4] Cited in another chapter of the volume from which this chapter is taken (*see* note 1).

Monroe declaration a common principle of all the American governments. This is one of the strongest indications that the correct interpretation of the Doctrine rejects the inference that the United States reserves to itself the privilege of doing the things it will not suffer Europe to do. If this earlier interpretation had been retained in practice the present bitterness against the Doctrine would never have developed in Hispanic America.

The Monroe message states very clearly the three following propositions: first, that there shall be no future colonization in America by European powers; second, that there shall be no extension of the monarchical system to republican America; third, that the United States will defend the independence of these American countries against European aggression. During the years that followed we seem to have added two corollaries to these three propositions: that European governments must not acquire any of the American governments' territory, even with the consent of the nation involved or by the adjustment of boundaries; and that non-American governments cannot occupy any portion of the American republics even temporarily for the satisfaction of any kind of claims against these republics. The first three of these proposals are the original Doctrine. The latter two are interpretations allowed by the Doctrine and which have developed out of recent experience in dealing with the Caribbean countries.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE

One of the greatest questions most often debated concerning the Doctrine is whether or not it is a purely selfish one, announced merely to protect the United States or designed as one of those altruistic services which we North Americans like to think we are doing to help smaller nations. Let us listen to what some present North Americans say about that phase of the subject: Mr. Root says:

> The Doctrine is not international law, but it rests upon the right of self-protection and that right is recognized by international law. The right is a necessary corollary of independent sovereignty. It is well

understood that the exercise of the right of self-protection may and frequently does extend in its effect beyond the limits of territorial jurisdiction of the state exercising it. . . . The most common exercise of the right of self-protection outside of a state's own territory, and in time of peace, is the interposition of objection to the occupation of territory, of points of strategic military or maritime advantage, or to indirect accomplishment of this effect by dynastic arrangement. . . . Of course each state must judge for itself when a threatened act will create such a situation. If any state objects to a threatened act and the reasonableness of its objection is not assented to, the efficacy of the objection will depend upon the power behind it.

It is doubtless true that in the adherence of the American people to the original declaration there was a great element of sentiment and sympathy for the people of South America who were struggling for freedom and it has been a source of great satisfaction to the United States that the course which it took in 1823 concurrently with the action of Great Britain played so great a part in assuring the right of self-government to the countries of South America. Yet is it to be observed that in reference to the South American Governments, as in all other respects, the international right upon which the declaration expressly rests is not sentiment or sympathy or a claim to dictate what kind of government any other country shall have, but the safety of the United States.

Mr. John Bassett Moore says:

The Monroe Doctrine was in its origin a defiance to those who would suppress independent governments and restore the system of commercial monopoly and political absolutism on the American continents. It was in this sense that it found an enthusiastic response in popular opinion.

Ex-president Taft has seen this point very clearly and says:

The Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed for the purpose of upholding the territorial dignity and political independence of the nations of South and Central America. It binds the United States to the exact course which the League of Nations demands of all nations.

Mr. Henry W. Taft says:

The Monroe Doctrine is not a principle of international law. It is a national policy based on the right of every nation to protect itself

against acts tending to embarass it in preserving its own national interests or political institutions. It is founded upon the same right as the familiar concert of European powers, except that it affects a greater number of nations more widely separated geographically, and is asserted by a single powerful nation, able, without the sanction of treaty stipulations, to maintain it. It does not become effective so much by the acquiesence of the American nations subject to its operation as from its recognition by nations of other parts of the world as a political policy which cannot be disregarded by them except at the risk of war with the United States.

Mr. John Bigelow says:

In order properly to appreciate the significance of the Monroe Doctrine it must be clearly recognized that it was designed primarily for the protection of the United States, the safeguarding of its territory and political institutions, the effect of which would be, indirectly, to work to the advantage of the Latin American countries by affording them the opportunity to work out their problems without interference from European powers.

Secretary of State Lansing gave the Senate the following account of the conversations which led to the Lansing-Ishii agreement:

Then it was during the same interview that we mentioned "paramount interests," and he (Ishii) made a reference to the Monroe Doctrine of the Far East; and I told him that there seemed to be a misconception as to the underlying principle of the Monroe Doctrine; that it was not an assertion of primacy or paramount interest by the United States in its relation to other American republics; that its purpose was to prevent foreign powers from interfering with the separate rights of any nation in this hemisphere and that the whole aim was to preserve to each republic the power of self-development. I said further that so far as aiding in this development the United States claimed no special privileges over other countries. . . .[5]

Rear-Admiral Chester says:

The first principle of the Monroe Doctrine—self-preservation—is axiomatic and immutable, and all other considerations must give way

[5] For a luminous discussion of the Monroe Doctrine in all its aspects political and economic, see *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law*, 1914.

to it. The second principle, like the constitution of a country, is amenable to changes and amendments that will bring it into accord with new conditions that may arise in the country. The question now, therefore, is, do the same conditions prevail on the western continent today as in 1823? . . . Many of the twenty other American Republics are no longer the weaklings they were when the policy was formulated, but are now strong enough to share the common defense of the continent. We cannot, however, with propriety form an alliance, for that word has been tabooed by an unwritten law of the land, but we can engage in an "entente," as foreigners call it, with the republics of South America that will give them a share in the responsibility of maintaining a policy which looks to the good of all parties concerned.

As Admiral Chester says, the doctrine is partly selfish and partly altruistic, as every natural principle should be. It seems very natural to suppose that the United States, being a weak nation in the early days, was particularly interested in protecting itself and also in advancing the great idea of democracy of which it was the pathfinder. Democratic government it selfishly and unselfishly desired to see grow—selfishly in that the development of such government on the American continent would tend to strengthen its own life, unselfishly in that it wished to encourage and assist other small nations to realize the same ideal.

A more practical question concerning the application of the Monroe Doctrine is the extent to which the United States assumes responsibility before the world for the shortcomings of the other American nations. If we say to Europe, "You are to keep completely out of this continent", how far do we expect to see to the just settlement of European complaints against those countries? Consider, for example, the matter of the collection of debts. If we will not let France enter Santo Domingo and take a couple of ports in payment of a ten million dollar debt, how far shall we interfere to make Santo Domingo pay? If an English subject is killed in Mexico and we do not allow England to obtain satisfaction by seizing Mexican territory, how far are we to assume the authority to punish Mexico and force her to deal fairly with England?

We have stated (Roosevelt said it, and it has been intimated many times by our government) that we will not keep European

governments from collecting their debts in the American republics. In fact we have permitted them to take measures to enforce payment of such debts as long as this did not mean territorial acquisition by them. At the time when interventon in Mexico was begun, with the announced purpose of collecting debts which that country owed Great Britain, France, and Spain the United States was invited to join with them. The situation was tried out to ascertain our attitude, and Secretary Seward wrote that the United States had no objection to these countries collecting their debts from Mexico. When it came to the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico, however, our attitude was very different.

We have never agreed with the claims of certain Hispanic American statesmen that debts should never be collected forcibly. We have adopted the Hague agreement that the question of debts of this kind shall be arbitrated, but we have undertaken to use moral suasion and more recently have actually assumed responsibility for managing the finances of certain republics in order to save them from a foreign foreclosure. We have thus assumed a protectorate over both Santo Domingo and Haiti because it was claimed that these countries were likely to be seized by European countries for non-payment of debt. But we have still to determine how far we will go in straightening out the financial difficulties of Hispanic American countries that seem to be in danger from European creditors.

The precedent of Santo Domingo, Haiti, and Nicaragua seems to indicate pretty clearly that, at least in the Caribbean, or what Admiral Chester calls the "larger Panama Canal Zone", we will take action before risking that of any foreign country. Indeed diplomatic aid in resuscitating the finances of Honduras, Cuba, Costa Rica, and possibly Mexico is now being extended by the United States, although in the case of Mexico the proceedings are still in the formative stage. It is interesting to note that the shift in world credit due to the war makes it altogether probable that the United States will itself more and more assume the rôle of creditor to these republics and that problems in connection with payment of debts will be given an entirely new turn.

European nations are not in position to finance foreign governments to any great extent, however profitable it might be.

It has been suggested by some thoughtful students that the Monroe Doctrine should be limited to Caribbean countries or at least those north of the Amazon, for the reason that the zone of defense of the Canal and of the continental United States extends no farther than that, and also for the reason that the countries farther south have grown strong in their own power and neither need nor appreciate our proffered protection. While a formal pronouncement of any such limitation of the Doctrine will probably never be made, it is almost certain that its application will be limited to this northern zone, as has been the case in the past. It may well be recalled in this connection that even when England and France intervened in Argentina, and Spain in Chile and Peru, the United States did no more than express sympathy to these countries. In this connection Dr. Estanislao Zaballos, of Buenos Aires, has said:

> What other countries of America have the same world problems as Panama or Mexico, the latter on the frontier of the United States and the former at the throat of the continent itself. They have nothing in common with the problems of the River Plate or the shores of Brazil or the coasts of Chile. The Monroe Doctrine is necessary today to the United States. The Caribbean washes the shores of the richest part of the United States and it is necessary that it be dominated by them in order to guarantee the independence and security of the United States.

The most important question concerning the Doctrine is whether it means that Europe must stay out of Hispanic American affairs and that the United States may go in, or simply that Europe shall stay out. It is difficult to see anything in the Monroe Doctrine to justify the assumption of an aggressive policy on the part of the United States toward Hispanic America. The original doctrine claims nothing for the United States that it does not concede to every other American nation. If in the Monroe Doctrine the United States arrogates to itself supremacy in the western hemisphere, it is only with respect to non-American powers, and with respect to them it wishes every American

nation to be supreme. There is nothing in it that makes its provisions a monopoly by the United States. The proclamation of a similar doctrine by each of the other American nations would strengthen rather than impair the force of the Monroe declaration.

In his address at the unveiling of the Bolivar statue in New York, President Harding clearly emphasized that the United States reserves no special privileges to itself under the Monroe Doctrine. Speaking to the entire Hispanic American diplomatic corps, he said:

> There have been times when the meaning of Monroeism was misunderstood by some, perverted by others and made the subject of distorting propaganda by those who saw in it an obstacle to the realization of their own ambitions. . . . They have falsely charged that we sought to hold the nations of the Old World at arm's length in order that we might monopolize the privilege of exploitation for ourselves. Others have protested that the doctrine would never be enforced if to enforce it should involve us in actual hostilities.
>
> The history of the generations since that Doctrine was proclaimed has proved that we never intended it selfishly; that we had no dream of exploitation. On the other side, the history of the last decade certainly must have convinced all the world that we stand willing to fight, if necessary, to protect these continents, these sturdy young democracies, from oppression and tyranny.

Nevertheless the Monroe Doctrine has been a continual source of irritation to the Hispanic American nations. At first they accepted it gladly, as we have seen, as protecting them from Europe, but later we see it becoming in their eyes an instrument through which the United States presumed to dictate to them. "America for the Americans", they say, means "America for the North Americans".

In the early days no such talk was heard as this of Señor José de Astorga, writing recently in *La Revista de America*:

> . . . The importance of securing concerted movement and unanimity of action among the countries of Latin America in order to offset the imperialistic ambitions of the United States is urgent and of extreme importance. The protests of con-fraternity, of disinterestedness and of respect for the political sovereignty and the commercial

independence of Latin America which the Government of the United States sets forth so freely on every occasion, are not able to counteract or to lessen the eloquence of deeds, and these are the deeds: Tutelage over Cuba; the abduction of Panama; the embargo on the custom houses of Santo Domingo; economic and military intervention in Central America; the "big stick," "dollar diplomacy" and the Lodge declaration.

The Hispanic Americans, however, are not alone in interpreting the Monroe Doctrine as meaning that the United States retains the right to control the western hemisphere. There are not a few North Americans who hold this view. These extracts from *America Among the Nations*, by Professor H. H. Powers, are certainly disquieting:

It is difficult to follow the expansion of America in the Caribbean without feeling that it will go farther. Whether it should go farther is not the question. This is neither an indictment nor a propaganda, but a study. No more is assumed than that national character shows a certain continuity, and that incentives which have been potent in the past are likely to be potent in the future. If so much be conceded, then the further development of Caribbean domination seems assured. If the considerations which have impelled us to restrict the liberty of Cuba, to take over the financial problems of Santo Domingo and to assume the management of Hayti, are legitimate then there is more work of this kind for us to do. Conditions were no worse in Hayti than in other Caribbean countries. Utter recklessness and incompetency have characterized the management of every one of these pseudo-states which the preoccupations of the real nations have temporarily abandoned to independence. It was a matter of chance which one of the dancers should first pay the piper, but all have danced and all must pay. As each faces in turn the inevitable crisis, the same problem presents itself. What reason is there to believe that we shall not meet it in the same way? (P. 140)

To the independence party Central America is its own little world. To the imperialistic party it is but a pawn on the mighty chessboard of world empire. We may sympathize with the one or the other but we must not judge the one by the standards of the other. The United States plays the vaster game, must play it and play it well, for the stake is its existence. (P. 140.)

We have learned subtler ways of winning, more varied ways of ruling. We have found new reasons for old impulses, and old impulses have renewed their youth.

Finally, we are still confronted with opportunity. More than any other people we have prizes within our grasp. And we are grasping them. Never was our frontier more alive than it is today. Acquisition of new territory has become a commonplace and passes unnoticed. Not one American in a hundred realizes that we have a protectorate over Hayti and that our control is creeping out through all these southern seas. If he knew, his only reaction would probably be a slightly increased complacency. The door is thus opened wide for a government, embarrassed by the mischievous irresponsibility of these petty make-believe states, to take refuge in an ever broadening imperialism. Unless the leopard changes his spots this must carry our frontier to the limits we have mentioned. (P. 159.)

Nor is the call of the tropics the only one. The war upon which we have now embarked has incalculable possibilities. We are committed not merely to the redressing of our grievances to date, but to the vastly larger program of settling such difficulties as the war itself may create. Without taking too seriously the fascinating program of "making the world safe for democracy," it is well to remember that the war is to be fought on European soil and in conjunction with nations having possessions in every part of the world. When the peace conference meets we shall hear very little of the sonorous slogans which heralded the war's beginning and much of the concrete problems for which these phrases suggest no very tangible solution. (P. 160.)

Such arguments as these certainly do not represent the best North American thought yet they are common enough to spread wide alarm in Hispanic America.

Probably the most illuminating discussion of the present Hispanic American attitude toward the Monroe Doctrine was the debate in 1914 in the columns of the *Atlantic Monthly* between Professor Hiram Bingham and Señor F. Garcia Calderón. Professor Bingham's article was entitled "The Monroe Doctrine, an Obselete Shibboleth." He argues for the abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine on the following grounds:

1. The Doctrine was proclaimed under a false conception of (a) geographical proximity, for the great centers of South American life

are nearer to Europe than to the United States, and (b) the existence of natural sympathy, which is difficult to encounter in Latin Americ a.

2. Latin America resents our attitude of being "practically sovereign on the continent" and opposed our war with Spain, our interference in Panama, Santo Domingo, etc.

3. It places the United States in the false position of being the collector of Europe's debts, bringing our intervention in these states on many false grounds and thus multiplying the prejudice of Latin America against us.

4. The great growth of some of the South American states in recent years is ignored in the application of the Doctrine. Viscount Bryce represents them as saying, "Since there are no longer rain clouds coming up from the East, why should our friend, however well-intentioned, insist on holding an umbrella over us?"

Professor Bingham concludes:

Let us face clearly the fact that the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine is going to cost the United States an immense amount of trouble, men and money. Carried out to its logical conclusion it means a policy of suzerainty and interference which will earn us the increased hatred of our neighbors, the dissatisfaction of Europe, the loss of commercial opportunity and the forfeit of time and attention which would better be given to settling our own difficult internal problems. The continuance of adherence to the Monroe Doctrine offers opportunity to scheming statesmen to distract public opinion from the necessity of concentrated attention at home by arousing mingled feelings of jingoism and self-importance in attempting to correct the errors of our neighbors.

Señor Calderón, whom readers of his *Latin America, Its Rise and Progress* would certainly not accuse of being partial to the United States, strongly maintained the usefulness of the Doctrine and its acceptability to Hispanic America if properly interpreted. He said:

If the United States would affirm that it also is in accord with the sovereign republics of the south, that it respects the territorial *status quo* in this American continent which its own triumphant expansion seems to threaten, an American system of law would be established, and the union of the two races which govern this huge continent would become a political fact of most far-reaching consequence. We should be

face to face, then, with a new Monroeism as the doctrine of American autonomy, accepted and proclaimed by all the people oversea, who would agree to protect one another against all future attempts at conquest, and then, in place of this vexing and harassing tutelage, we should have a sturdy declaration of American solidarity.

Even by 1911 these generous plans showed signs of development. The United States, Brazil, and Argentina, through friendly intervention, averted an imminent war between Peru and Ecuador. When they pacified Central America, Mexico came to their aid, and thenceforward their action no longer bore any resemblance to the intrusion of foreigners. It was in the name of a doctrine not only North American but Pan American that the peoples of the New World addressed the powerful nations which stood ready to tear them in pieces. No one then criticised this intervention of the great countries of the New World, of North Saxon and South Latin. The United States played its part also—which made its moral influence acceptable to the Spanish American nations.

In principle the Monroe Doctrine is an essential article in the public code of the New World. Two newspapers of Buenos Aires, *La Argentina* and *La Razón*, have come to recognize it as such. In them we read that the United States is the "safeguard of American interests", and they praise the North American republic for the paternal protection which it offers. It is only the brutal expression of the doctrine, the cynical imperialism which is deduced from it, which becomes dangerous to the moral unity of the continent.

The wisest statesmen have no thought of divorcing this doctrine from the future history of America, even when they criticise its excesses most severely.

The men of the North have a civilizing function to fulfil in a continent wherein they exercise supreme power. If their behavior is disinterested, if they prevent war, if they fertilize these new countries abundantly with the gold of their banks, if they become apostles of peace and international justice, no one will ever forget the grandeur of their political rôle in the world's politics.

In considering the behavior of the United States toward its neighbors, we must distinguish quite clearly between its attitude regarding Panama and its policy toward countries south of the Isthmus. Toward South America its intervention deserves only respect. The purely selfish interest of the United States evidently lay in the acceptance of war and anarchy, in accordance with the classical formula "divide and

rule"; yet the United States has kept the peace. From Panama to the La Plata it is working for the union of the peoples and for civilization.

Here, then, is an aspect of the Monroe Doctrine of perpetual usefulness: the struggle against the wars which threaten to ruin the New World, still poor and thinly populated—intervention with the olive branch. In stimulating the union of South American republics the United States is at the same time protecting its own commercial interests, menaced by this perpetual turmoil. If its action were to halt there, if it renounced all territorial acquisition and set its face against all interference with the internal affairs of every state, the doctrine so often condemned would seem born anew and no one would dare to criticise its efficacy. Most of all, it is on the score of irregular political practices, of fomenting revolution, that the excessive tutelage of the United States comes in for most widespread condemnation. An Argentine writer, Manuel Ugarte, has summarized this sentiment in the phrase, "We wish to be brothers of the North Americans, not their slaves". Even if this tutelage were designed to prepare democracies without democratic tradition for self-government after the Saxon method; even if, as in the case of Cuba, it is granted partial liberty and provisional privileges, the passionate feeling for independence which is so widespread throughout America would be exceedingly irritated by this rather contemptuous method of education. Great Britain pays more repect to the autonomy of her colonies than the new Saxon democracy is willing to bestow upon the still fragile independence of some American republics. What would be thought of the attitude of a Conservative minister of Great Britain who put a veto on the action of the Socialist government of Australia by dissolving the colonial Parliament and criticising the laws of the free "Commonwealth"? One cannot comprehend the policy which American peoples are often obliged to endure in their relations with Washington.

In Latin America people do not understand the United States. A few offhand judgments often control the decision which leads Latin Americans to antagonism or to unreflecting infatuation. The Americans of the North are thought to be "practical people". Men say that they are intensely covetous of riches. They have no morality. The business man, always hard and arrogant in mind and brutal in method, is the symbol of the nation. Ideals, dreams, noble ambitions, never stir their breasts. These characteristics of the North American the men of the South, according to their individual ideas, admire or despise.

They forget how austere is the grandeur that Americans of the North acquire from their superb idealism, from their strong Puritan tradition, from the lust of gold made subservient to ambition for power and for influence over men. They are ignorant of the mysticism which forever flourishes in the United States, continually creating new sects, the perpetual Christian Renaissance whose energy was so greatly admired by William James. We must admit that in South American countries, with their narrow and superficial religiosity, we do not find this great concern regarding the line which divides the ideal from the fact. The example of the United States, the reading of its poets, the study of Emerson, the influence of its universities, an examination of the part which wealth has played in this democracy, would, I conceive, go far toward reforming the bad manners of the South and make it appreciate the true fundamentals of the grandeur of North America.

In my book on the Latin democracies I have set forth the contrasts which may easily be established between the Catholicism of the Spanish Americans, the state religion, uniform and formal, and the restless and active Protestantism of the United States; between the mixture of races in the South and that racial pride, "the white man's burden" which controls northern opinion. It would be very easy to push this analysis further and to set forth the strength of aristocratic prejudices among the Spaniards and the very democratic spirit which exists among the Saxons; to contrast the idealism of the North with the less vast, less generous ambition of the South; or the stanch, puritanical domestic life among the South Americans with a certain license of morals which exists in North America. But, in spite of this sharp contrast, there are resemblances not less evident than the divergent traits, an Americanism which gives a certain unity to the entire New World. All evidence points to the conclusion that if the United States acts in accord with Latin America, if the Monroe Doctrine loses its aggressive character, the influence of these twenty nations will be a force in the world's progress which cannot be despised.

That is the serious judgment of one of the great Hispanic American writers and diplomats, a man who becomes most indignant when he discusses North American imperialism.

CONFUSION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE WITH OTHER POLICIES

With the passing of the years the Monroe Doctrine has been confused with at least three new ideas that have grown up during

the period of our relations with the rest of the American continent. In the first place, we have confused it with the headship of the United States in America.

The United States has developed a hundred times more rapidly than any other country in America, and as a natural outgrowth of that development it has necessarily assumed the headship of the American nations. It is more or less the story of all history. The process is similar to that by which the Bishop of Rome became the Pope—the smaller bishoprics sent their problems to the great man in the city and thus his influence developed until he became supreme. In the same way the United States has grown very naturally into a position of leadership on the American continent. Whether we like it or whether Hispanic America likes it, there is no way of preventing the most advanced and most powerful nation in the group from exercising the greatest influence.

This headship signified, among other things, that we must lead in the building of the Panama Canal, though of course it did not prescribe the method. It likewise meant that we must acquire naval stations and zones of influence for the protection of the Canal and all that that implies. But the Monroe Doctrine has nothing whatever to do with this. These things came about from the position we necessarily assumed as the greatest nation on the continent. Perhaps we did not have to do it in quite the way we did; better ways could have been found. Nevertheless the burden was laid upon us and we could not get away from it, so we took the lead just as other great nations have done in other parts of the world where their influence was dominant. Thus the various "Pan American Congresses" met with little success until the greatest American nation entered and lent its overpowering influence to their promotion.

The second principle with which the Monroe Doctrine is confused is that of imperialism. Imperialism has nothing to do with the Monroe Docrtine, but is merely one of those tendencies of modern nations to take over smaller and more poorly organized countries. We have been following other peoples in doing that, for the tendency is not only world wide but is a

factor in the economic as well as the political field today. Most of our territory has really been gained at the expense of other nations. Let it be said to our credit, however, that in contrast with most modern imperialistic nations, we bought most of the territory acquired. This is our imperialistic policy, a thing apart from the Monroe Doctrine. Let us remind our Hispanic American friends that Chile, Brazil, and Argentina have done like things. The big nations in South America have done as the big nation in North America. Of course it is easy to think the United States is the only sinner in the world, but every big nation is imperialistic. It is not the Monroe Doctrine that prompts us to do these things, it is the great and prepossessing idea of empire building. We are not nearly as guilty on this score as Great Britain.

The third point of confusion is with the idea of Pan Americanism. By Pan Americanism we understand the recognition of a community of interests among all American countries and a determination to work these out coöperatively to the best advantage of all concerned. The present tendency is to create a concert of American powers to act together for mutual protection and help, the maintenance of peace and the promotion of better commercial, political and intellectual relations. And this is not the Monroe Doctrine.

These three matters of headship, imperialism, and Pan Americanism have all exerted an appreciable influence in our relations with Hispanic America, but they should not be confounded with Monroeism. We will clarify our action and our understanding of all inter-American relations as soon as we cease lumping everything related to Hispanic America under the one conception of Monroeism, which, after all, is to the average citizen of the United States largely a sentiment.

The address of President Wilson to the Mexican editors probably delighted Hispanic America more than any other official utterance with the exception of Mr. Root's famous speech at Rio de Janeiro. Mr. Wilson said:

> The famous Monroe Doctrine was adopted without your consent, without the consent of any of the Central or South American states.

If I may express it in the terms that we so often use in this country, we said, "We are going to be your big brother whether you want us to be or not". We did not ask whether it was agreeable to you that we should be your big brother. We said we were going to be. Now that was all very well so far as protecting you from agression from the other side of the water was concerned, but there was nothing in it that protected you from aggression from us, and I have repeatedly seen the uneasy feeling on the part of representatives of the states of Central and South America that our self-appointed protection might be for our own benefit and our own interests and not for the interests of our neighbors. So I said, "Very well, let us make some arrangement by which we will give bond. Let us have a common guarantee, that all of us will sign, of political independence and territorial integrity. Let us agree that if any one of us, the United States included, violates the political independence or the territorial integrity of any of the others, all the others will jump on her."

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

What effect has the World War, which has affected all international relations, had on the Monroe Doctrine? In answering this question one is again confronted with the basic question of the meaning of the Doctrine. President Wilson said, in addressing the Senate on June 22, 1917, that "The nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world." He explained that under this world doctrine no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the weak along with the great and powerful.

President Wilson's understanding of the Monroe Doctrine is here clearly revealed. It is certainly not the same as Professor Bingham had when he advocated its abandonment because it kept us from being well regarded in Hispanic America. The simple Monroe and Wilson insistence that each nation shall have the right to develop along its own lines, without interference from the outside, that, "good faith and justice toward all nations" shall prevail, represents an entirely different concep-

tion. While Monroe's proposal was that no European nation should seek to extend its authority over an American nation, Wilson proposed that no nation in any part of the world should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people.

This interpretation of the Doctrine was the one given it by President Cleveland in dealing with the Venezuelan boundary dispute, when he said that the Doctrine found its basis "in the theory that every nation shall have its rights protected and its just claims enforced". At the same time Secretary Olney pointed out to Great Britain that "the people of the United States had a vital interest in the cause of self-government" and that the British attitude toward Venezuela so threatened the American policy that if the power of the United States was adequate to prevent the carrying out of British purposes it would be done.

It is natural that this doctrine, maintained for a century and resulting in giving weaker nations in America a chance to develop without outside interference, should be of value in developing a world policy that would protect small nations. That the efficacy of the Monroe Doctrine has depended on the force the United States could bring to its support, suggests of course the need of force to support any world application of the same principle—the principle which has been recognized in the formation of the League of Nations.

Just as the Hispanic American peoples had favored the original Monroe Doctrine and appreciated its protection from Europe, so they immediately welcomed the extension of the doctrine to the whole world as embodied in the League of Nations. For strangely enough our southern neighbors, believing that the United States has shifted from the original purpose of the Doctrine and is now using it merely for its own selfish purposes, saw in the proposal to bring the world into the agreement a guarantee that Hispanic America would not only be protected from Europe but from the United States itself.

The League of Nations was received with the greatest enthusiasm by all the southern countries. Here was the movement that would get the American nations beyond the *impassé* which

had been reached in the much talked-of Pan Americanism. For though on one hand the United States could not give up the historic Monroe Doctrine, on the other the Hispanic Americas could never come into free relations with their northern neighbor within that Doctrine if it meant, as it seemed to have come to mean, the hegemony of the United States in the Pan American family.

But here was the way out of the dilemma—make the doctrine world wide. The United States would surrender nothing of its historic insistence that European nations must not project themselves into American life, and Hispanic America would have its fears and its implied inferiority removed, since the United States would thus assume the same obligation to respect the independence of the small American states as did all other nations. Thus the greatest difficulty in the way of continental solidarity would disappear without embarrassment to any of the parties.

This feeling was well expressed by the Cuban, Orestes Ferrara, in his review, *La Reforma Social*, as follows:

> When Mr. Wilson and Mr. Taft refer to the declarations of President Monroe and insist that the detachment of American nations will not receive a blow but on the contrary will be more absolute because the doctrine is universally accepted by the establishment of the League, they say something that reveals very clearly how their minds turn to the past when the principle of the independence of American nations was threatened by the transference of the consequences of another great European conflict to American soil. Evidently Wilson and Taft regard the Monroe Doctrine in its original sense, the most just to other rights. It is not so with Senators Knox and Lodge. They think of the Doctrine as it has been practised for the last twenty-five years, which seems to have justified the relations with Panama, Nicaragua, Santo Domingo, Haiti, etc., and which has established the absolute dominion of the United States over the Americas. The difference is therefore paramount, being on the one hand a principle and on the other a selfish interest.
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> The truth is that there has never been a declaration in the international life of the world with purer ideas and more noble purposes than the Monroe Doctrine. The North American statesmen of that time

had the most unselfish ideas about it. Jefferson, from his retirement, gave to it the whole endorsement of his serene mind and tranquil soul. But in the course of time the formula "The United States standing before Europe in defense of the Americas" naturally brought the predominance of the United States in America. And if the United States had not practised in her international relations the Anglo-Saxon principle that the rights of others shall not be interfered with unless one's own interests are clearly threatened, a situation of this kind would have been fatal to the rest of America.

To be more specific, we may affirm that if any other nation than the United States had had her hands free in America as she has, with power to make or unmake the map south of the Rio Grande and even to do so with the blessings of Europe, the rights of Latin America would have suffered profoundly.

But this relative prudence has not vitiated the change of form of the Monroe Doctrine which makes it not the old powerful and unilateral declaration of the early days, but a real program of action which permitted the presidents of the United States to dictate rules for American international politics and even national political rules to apply to other countries. Thus the Caribbean has come to be considered as a *mare nostrum*. The United States has come to regard the Monroe Doctrine, thus transformed, as backing those other policies—trade follows the flag, and dollar diplomacy.

Thus Wilson and Taft on the one hand and Lodge and Knox on the other, since they speak of different periods of the Monroe Doctrine, are both right when one maintains that the League of Nations will maintain the Doctrine intact and the others contend that the opposite is true.

Discussing the question of the League, if the United States, having helped to break the balance of power in Europe by defeating Germany, should remain outside the alliance of the victorious nations, her isolation will not mean her strength but her weakness. The obligations of the Monroe Doctrine would not then be carried against a divided Europe, but before an alliance of states victorious on sea and land. It is not easy to prophesy the difficulties of the future, but it can be seen that the mission assumed by the United States will be full of difficulties, as it has in the past. To share jointly these responsibilities should mean the obviating of conflicts or diminishing the possibility of conflicts which may take place not in Europe but in the tranquil Americas.

On abandoning the rights of exclusive protection, she would be free of multiplied responsibilities and know that, if a conflict occurred, it would be concerning matters that affected her directly and not remotely. The principles of Washington and Monroe would have passed through a complete evolution and become the admitted principles of all humanity, not simply the canons of American law.

The Monroe Doctrine could thus become the doctrine of the world. Only the aspirations of conquest which make of the doctrine of defense of the small nations of this continent an excuse for continual aggression approaching an American Prussianism, will have died forever.

But this wise and just solution of the Pan American *impassé* was not to be. A group of North Americans who appreciated the necessity of protecting their own prerogatives but not those of any other nations, insisted on the Covenant of the League making specific acknowledgment that, while all the nations of the world would surrender all special privileges and rights of interference with their neighbors, the United States must still have the special privilege of determining the course of national development in the western hemisphere. So the following was inserted as Article XXI, of the Covenant:

> Nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.

If this article had gone further and defined the Monroe Doctrine as not giving the United States any special privileges on the American continent, but meaning, as President Wilson had intimated, that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, there could have been no objection. But this was not done. And so at one stroke the old situation was continued and made worse. For it looked as if this was a move to have the whole world agree to leave with the United States the determination of all American questions. And, of course, if the Hispanic American nations signed the covenant, they themselves became guarantors of an arrangement which those who insisted on the inclusion of this reservation stated to mean that the

United States would have the right to interfere in the national life of the other American nations whenever it deemed such a course expedient.

Here was Hispanic America's dilemma: If it stayed out of the League it lost the opportunity of being linked up with the only organization that offered to help the small nation. If it went in it signed a document which might mean its agreement to complete domination by its great northern neighbor. Hispanic America was much in the position of a man who is forced to borrow a certain sum of money to escape ruin, but who is asked to sign a note for an unknown amount in order to get the money. It leaves him in doubt as to whether he is to be ruined now or later.

This was what led little Salvador to direct a note to our Department of State asking for a definition of the Monroe Doctrine. This note, in the first place, recites that despite its neutrality in the war, Salvador manifested "its sympathy on every occasion for the ideals which animated the Government of the United States in entering the war", praises President Wilson for "having crystallized the legitimate hopes of a fruitful peace by submitting the draft of a League of Nations covenant", says Salvador, "manifests the desire to adhere to this treaty which sanctions arbitration as the only method of settling disputes between nations", and continues:

> The whole text of the treaty is both suggestive and attractive. In it there is a return to those principles of life long awaited by sociologists and publicists. And indeed it seems as if from the ruins of war there have arisen with greater strength and potency the beautiful gospels which in a moment of folly were relegated to the discard by those who through the immutable laws of international interdependence were especially charged with sustaining and upholding them.
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> The text of the treaty contains however, one article which has awakened warm discussions throughout the whole American continent including the United States, due no doubt to its brevity and lack of clearness. I refer to Article XXI, drafted in the following terms: Nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional

understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.

The legal scope of this provision from an international viewpoint is open to differing interpretations, since in the vast scheme of the League of Nations treaties of arbitration and regional understandings, such as the Monroe Doctrine, are recognized and sanctioned, despite the fact that as to the highly peaceful purpose of the latter doctrine there does not exist harmonious meeting of minds nor an absolute criterion.

From the year 1823, in which the distinguished James Monroe rejected all intervention by European nations in the affairs of the American continent to the present day, this doctrine has undergone different applications depending upon the diverse political tendencies prevailing at that particular time in the United States.

It would be unnecessary, Mr. Secretary, to undertake any detailed exposition of the various views of prominent thinkers and public men of the United States as to the genuine and correct interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, which former Secretary of State Elihu Root regarded as "a declaration based on the right of the people of the United States to protect itself as a nation, and which could not be transformed into a declaration, joint or common, to all the nations of America or even to a limited number of them".

My Government recognizes that the Monroe Doctrine consolidated the independence of the Continental States of Latin America, and saved them from the great danger of a European intervention. It realizes that it is a powerful factor in the existence of the democratic form of government on this continent and that it raises a barrier to European colonization.

Since, however, the covenant of the League of Nations does not set forth nor determine the purposes nor fix a definite criterion of international relationship in America, and since, on the other hand, the doctrine will be forthwith transformed—in view of the full sanction of the nations of the world—into a principle of universal public law, *juris et de jure*, I request that your Excellency will be good enough to give the authentic interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine as it is understood in the present historical moment and in its future application by the Government of the United States, which must realize that my Government is keenly desirous of securing a statement which shall put an end to the divergence of views now prevailing on the subject, which it is recognized by all is not the most propitious in stimulating the ideals of true Pan Americanism.

Contrary to the authorized and respected view of former Secretary of State Root, the Monroe Doctrine through its inclusion in the covenant of the League of Nations will be converted without doubt into a genesis of American international law.

Since any amendment to the text of the treaty and even the rejection of all of its provisions by the American Senate would still leave intact the various points which this international agreement covers as to the other signatory nations, by virtue of their general and expressed acceptance, the principle embraced in the League of Nations, and therefore the Monroe Doctrine, would be virtually accepted as a fundamental principle of public American law by all those countries that signed or manifested their adherence to the Peace Treaty.

The necessity of an interpretation of the genesis and scope of the Monroe Doctrine not only in the development of the lofty purpose of Pan Americanism, but in order that that Doctrine may maintain its original purity and prestige, is rendered all the more urgent.

Even before El Salvador had written its now famous note to the Department of State, Ex-president Bonilla of Honduras, who represented his country at the Peace Conference, presented to that body the following communication:

In this covenant all peoples represented in this Conference are directly interested; the smaller nations, like that which I represent, more if possible than the greater ones. Its bases, as expressed by the Commission, are not known; but the public press has asserted that amendments have been proposed: among these a proposal by the delegation of North America, to declare that "the pact shall not affect the validity of other international conventions such as the arbitration treaties or regional understandings, like the Monroe Doctrine, to assure the maintenance of peace".

The Monroe Doctrine affects the Latin American republics directly. As it has never been written into an international document, nor been expressly accepted by the nations of the Old Continent, nor of the New World; and as it has been defined and applied in different manners by presidents and other statesmen of the United States of America, I believe that it is necessary that in the pact about to be subscribed it should be defined with entire clearness, in such way that it may be incorporated in the written international law.

The North American delegation is presided over by the Honorable Woodrow Wilson, and it is certain that if the Monroe Doctrine was

not defined the delegation had in mind the definition of interpretation that Mr. Wilson, as President of the United States, has given to it in his various addresses from that which he voiced at Mobile in 1913 to the last in the current year. In these he declared that the Doctrine is not a menace, but is a guaranty for the feeblest of the nations of America; and he repudiated expressly the interpretations that had been made to signify that the United States had a right to exercise a kind of tutelage over the other republics of America.

Especially in his discourse with the Mexican journalists on June 7th, 1919, he declared that the guaranty that this Doctrine implied in favor of the feeble countries is not with relation to the powers of the Old World only, but relates to the United States also; and that he spoke of the celebration of a Pan American pact that might be realized and might include this point. Such declarations have made President Wilson the best of the exponents of the ideals of the peoples of Latin America.

All these facts induce me to present the accompanying proposition, which I hope will merit a favorable reception by the delegation of the United States, and will be supported by the Latin American republics, which with it will pay their tribute of admiration and respect to the First Magistrate of the North American republic, that has given such proofs of its love of justice.

If the American amendment to which I referred is phrased in the terms published, or in others like them, the pact of the League of Nations will be no obstacle to a union or confederation of other form, by the peoples of Latin America, that will tend to a realization of the dream of the immortal Bolívar.

The clause which Dr. Bonilla offered as an addition to the proposed compact of the League of Nations may be translated as follows:

This Doctrine, that the United States of America has maintained since the year 1823, when it was proclaimed by President Monroe, signifies that: All the republics of America have a right to independent existence; that no nation may acquire by conquest any part of the territory of any of these nations, nor interfere with its internal government or administration, nor do any other act to impair its autonomy or to wound its national dignity. It is not to hinder the "Latin" American countries from confederating or in other forms uniting themselves, seeking the best way to realize their destiny.

The view taken generally in Hispanic America of the Salvadorean note is well illustrated by the following editorial utterance of *El Universal*, of Mexico City:

We published yesterday the Note addressed by the republic of El Salvador to the Secretary of State of the North American Union asking for an exact interpretation of the 21st article of the protocol of the League of Nations, referring to the recognition of the Monroe Doctrine by the Latin American nations. It is a document of far-reaching importance.

On the appearance in 1823 of the Monroe Doctrine, it had the character, as has been expressed by the eminent Chilean statesman, Don Alejandro Alvarez, of a sort of gospel of the New World. President Monroe, according to Alvarez, though taking his stand exclusively on the interests of his own country, in his famous message to Congress summarized and expressed admirably and clearly the political situation and aspirations of the whole New World. Circumstances then obtaining in Europe made some such declaration urgent. There was a controversy on between Russia and England over the boundaries of their possessions in America; and besides—and graver still—the countries signatory to the Holy Alliance were suspected of the purpose of coming to the help of Spain for reconquering her lost American colonies. When, therefore, the United States proclaimed its affirmation that the New World ought to be governed by republican organizations, and that all the countries on this side are free and equal, as relates to Europe, the independence of the bourgeoning republics was assured—an attitude on the part of the Northern Republic which cannot fail to meet with the goodwill of the other countries.

Up to that point, and for the reasons set forth, the Monroe Doctrine could not be considered a particular expression of the sentiments of the United States; it was rather the crystallization in international relations of the aspirations of all America. But since then, as the various countries of the continent have gone forward in their evolution, the Latin republics have not always moved harmoniously with the United States —nor even with one another. Thus it has come about that while some publicists consider the Monroe Doctrine as a sort of tacit agreement among all the American nations for warding off the occupation of territory by Europe, or its active intervention in American affairs, there are others who have come to believe that the only thing the United States had in view in promulgating the Doctrine was to substitute their own

intervention for that of Europe in the affairs of the other nations of this continent, and, in that connection, it has not yet been settled whether acts of imperialism, deliberately engaged in by the United States against the sovereignty of Latin American republics, are or are not subject to regulation by the Monroe Doctrine.

It is a state of things which has resulted in many misunderstandings. We do not know, really, what to think; as, in view of diverse and even contrary interpretations by different statesmen, the Monroe Doctrine or "Monroeism" has become something extremely foggy and obscure. It is to this fact that is due the lack of confidence in it on the part of the Latin republics; to this, and to nothing else, was due the statement on the part of our Government recently that it did not recognize that Doctrine.

President Wilson himself seemed to justify that want of confidence when he suggested in his address to the Mexican editors in June, 1919, that all the Latin American countries should undertake a revision of that Doctrine and should come to an agreement that would put the question of their independence outside the danger of any imperialistic encroachment. If thus the very author of the League of Nations admitted less than a year before that it was only natural that the Monroe Doctrine should inspire some want of confidence in Latin America, as not being a real community pact, how can those nations, which have not yet been called into the consultation, adhere to the League of Nations in which the Monroe Doctrine is explicitly recognized?

As we see the matter, El Salvador has put a finger on the sore spot, as the saying goes, in this most complicated matter of American politics. Will its note bring about a general revision, a Pan American revision such as Wilson intimated, of the Monroe Doctrine? Unless some such thing happens, we do not see how the Latin American nations can sign a compact, such as that of the League of Nations, unless some light can be thrown on a matter that so profoundly concerns their interests.

The framing of a reply to Salvador taxed the ingenuity of our Department of State. But a way out was happily found by a simple citation of the address of President Wilson before the Second Pan American Scientific Congress, where the President had discussed the Monroe Doctrine as follows:

The Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed by the United States on her own authority. It has always been maintained, and always will be

maintained, upon her own responsibility. But the Monroe Doctrine demanded merely that European governments should not attempt to extend their political systems to this side of the Atlantic. It did not disclose the use which the United States intended to make of her power on this side of the Atlantic. It was a hand held up in warning, but there was no promise in it of what America was going to do with the implied and partial protectorate which she apparently was trying to set up on this side of the water, and I believe you will sustain me in the statement that it has been fears and suspicions on this score which have hitherto prevented the greater intimacy and confidence and trust between the Americas. The states of America have not been certain what the United States would do with her power. That doubt must be removed. And latterly there has been a very frank interchange of views between the authorities in Washington and those who represented the other states of this hemisphere, an interchange of views charming and hopeful, because based upon an increasingly sure appreciation of the spirit in which they were undertaken. These gentlemen have seen that, if America is to come into her own, into her legitimate own, in a world of peace and order, she must establish the foundations of amity, so that no one will hereafter doubt them:

I hope and believe that this can be accomplished. These conferences have enabled me to foresee how it will be accomplished. It will be accomplished, in the first place, by the states of America uniting in guaranteeing to each other absolute political independence and territorial integrity. In the second place, and as a necessary corollary to that, guaranteeing the agreement to settle all pending boundary disputes as soon as possible and by amicable process; by agreeing that all disputes among themselves, should they unhappily arise, will be handled by patient, impartial investigation and settled by arbitration; and the agreement necessary to the peace of the Americas, that no state of either continent will permit revolutionary expeditions against another state to be fitted out on its territory, and that they will prohibit the exportations of munitions of war for the purpose of supplying revolutionists against neighboring governments.

This reply was received by Salvador with diplomatic expressions of appreciation, but that country's leaders, as well as those of other Hispanic American countries, recognize that the sentiments expressed by one of our presidents before a scientific gathering cannot be considered as an authoritative and

binding definition of any fundamental policy like the Monroe Doctrine. They want rather a declaration in which the executive and legislative branches of the government, after a discussion which allowed public opinion to express itself, would officially state the position of the nation.

The following words of Señor A. de Manos-Albas, written a few years ago in the English *Review of Reviews*, still remain true:

> The means to accomplish unity of sentiment and to dispel the misgivings between the United States and Latin America is not far to seek. It is only required to amplify the Monroe Doctrine to the full extent of its logical development. If the United States should declare that the era of conquest on the American continent has been closed to all and forever, beginning with themselves, the brooding storm of distrust will disappear from the Latin American mind, and an international cordiality of incalculable possibilities will ensue, not only for the welfare of the American nations, but universally for the cause of freedom and democracy.

At this writing the United States is in a most peculiar position. Having insisted upon inserting the Monroe Doctrine clause into the Covenant, a clause in which no other nation in the world was interested and to which many were opposed, the United States finds itself the only nation of consequence out of the League. The Hispanic American countries were so enthusiastic for the League idea that fourteen out of twenty of them signed, with the Monroe Doctrine clause and all, almost without debate. The United States was expected to join as well. Most of these countries followed the United States into the war and they all thought they were going with that country into the League. Now they are awakening to the fact that their supposed leader is not with them, and the situation is a bit disconcerting to some of them.

The situation reminds one of an incident in the French Revolution when a group of politicians sat discussing matters of state. A great mob rushed by the building. One of the group jumped to his feet, ran to the door and exclaimed, "There go my people. I must hurry and follow them, for I am their leader!"

The complaisant North American may smile at the mention

of the possibility of our losing our position of dominance on this continent, but the present situation at least suggests the development of a condition which will unite the rest of America with Europe rather than with us. It is easy to note that among Hispanic Americans there is great confusion over the situation, and some frankly say that the present division may mean a final separation of the Hispanic American countries from North America. Commenting on the presidential election in the United States, *La Nación*, of Buenos Aires, a paper which all during the war ardently supported the United States, said:

> Confronted with the dilemma of abandoning either the League of Nations or the Monroe Doctrine, the Latin American countries probably would choose to abandon the latter. Many people in the United States have believed that the various South American countries, members of the League, would withdraw in order to follow the policy inspired by the United States, and contrary, naturally, to the League. . . .
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> The declaration on the Monroe Doctrine Senator Harding made to the correspondent of *La Nación* hardly seems an adequate cause for the South American members of the League to abandon it. In effect Senator Harding told our correspondent that the Monroe Doctrine was not an international pact or agreement but a declaration of policy by the United States which promised protection against abuses or agressions by European nations, precisely an interpretation which causes the greatest resistance from most, if not all, of these countries, and which is contrary to the interpretation President Wilson has given, according to which the Doctrine established among the American nations a most perfect equality—an equality that cannot exist if the question of protection that is not asked is the product entirely of the one-sided resolution of a power declaring itself the protector against dangers in which no one believes.

If the United States does not form part of the League, these southern countries will find themselves in a different camp from the United States, having acquired a special status in relation to other members of the League, and will be forced to consider the United States as a factor to some extent foreign to the development of their peaceful policy. This surely will not be satisfactory either to them or to us, in view of the sincere desire of

both parties that an accord shall exist between the two sections of the continent.

This reported interview with President Harding raises an important question concerning the Monroe Doctrine about which there is absolute difference of opinion. The President is reported as intimating that the Doctrine is not to be considered as an international agreement, but solely as a declaration of the United States, maintained by the power of the United States. Secretary Root, already quoted, also said that it would under no circumstances become a joint agreement.

But President Roosevelt said, in an address at Rio de Janeiro:

> All the nations which are sufficiently advanced, such as Brazil and the United States, should participate on an absolute equality in the responsibilities and development of this doctrine so far as the interests of the western hemisphere as a whole are concerned. It must be made a continental and not a unilateral doctrine. . . . If ever, as regards any country, intervention does unfortunately become necessary, I hope that wherever possible it will be a joint intervention by such powers as Brazil and the United States, without the thought of self-aggrandizement by any of them, and for the common good of the western world.

As has already been shown, President Wilson accepted the same idea of the Monroe Doctrine being extendable not only to all America but to the whole world. In this same spirit were his words in addressing Congress December 7, 1915, when he said:

> There was a time in the early days of our great nation and of the republics fighting their way to independence in Central and South America, when the government of the United States looked upon itself as in some sort the guardian of the republics to the south of her as against any encroachments or efforts at political control from the other side of the water; felt it its duty to play the part even without invitation from them; and I think that we can claim that the task was undertaken with a true and disinterested enthusiasm for the freedom of the Americas and the unmolested self-government of her independent peoples. But it was always difficult to maintain such a rôle without offense to the pride of the peoples whose freedom of action we sought to protect, and without provoking serious misconceptions of our motives, and every

thoughtful man of affairs must welcome the altered circumstances of the new day in whose light we now stand, when there is no claim of guardianship or thought of wards, but, instead, a full and honorable association as of partners between ourselves and our neighbors, in the interest of all America, north and south.

It is this spirit faithfully carried out that will make all Hispanic America join with us in the support of the Monroe Doctrine and be at one with us in building a continental solidarity. The following comment by *La Prensa*, of Buenos Aires, on this message is expressive of the way all Hispanic America responds to such sentiment:

There has been a gradual and continuous change in the American policy toward the republics of this continent. These changes have been coincident with the visits of prominent Americans to South America, with the result that a better knowledge of the state of civilization which has been reached by South Americans has become more general. This has been the principal cause of the gradual transformation. The Monroe Doctrine is now essentially modified. It is necessary that it should no longer have the character of tutelage that it had at the time of its origin, but it must undergo an evolution toward Pan Americanism.

No higher, more fundamental, more authoritative utterance has been made on the subject that that embodied in President Wilson's message. President Wilson made his statement without reserve and with sincerity, showing that it was the result of serene reflection. According to President Wilson, Monroeism will be a means of defense of this continent, but all the American states will be members of the international community, the United States having the same sovereign rank as the others.

President Wilson's message will be as transcendent as was President Monroe's, both being in accord with regard to solidarity, but differing in regard to the conception of circumstances. President Wilson's program does not lack anything necessary to the high development of ideals.

Let all America then unite in supporting the Monroe Doctrine, and when all have gone into a World League of Nations, let a sub-division of that league act as the American League, suggested by Bolivar in 1826 and by Wilson in 1917, to promote peace and mutual prosperity among all American nations.

Dr. Baltasar Brum, President of Uruguay, in an address before the University students of the capital of his country, has suggested this League of American Nations in the following important declarations:

Owing to the state in which European countries remain after the struggle, it may be said that fear of invasion by them in America has been removed for many years. But is that sufficient reason for us to take no interest in the future and turn away from the Monroe Doctrine with the pretext that it is now unnecessary? I believe that today, more than ever, we should use foresight in searching for formulas that may assure forever the peace and full independence of American countries.

The principles of American solidarity, based on the constitution of a continental league, is more ample than the Monroe Doctrine, because it will not only defend the countries of America against foreign invaders but also against imperialistic tendencies which might arise among themselves.

The formation of this league, in my opinion, would be a logical consequence of the Treaty of Versailles, which, in recognizing and expressly accepting the Monroe Doctrine, seems to be desirous of limiting its field of action, so far as American affairs are concerned. On the other hand, the Supreme Council of the League of Nations is composed principally of the delegates of the great powers, nearly all the American countries having been excluded. These countries need, therefore, to create a powerful organization to look after their interests in the decisions arrived at by the League of Nations. Harmonious and joint action by the "American League" would avoid European intervention in our affairs.

Some have objected to this League of American Nations because they fear it would become a rival to the World League. But there seems to be no reason why such a league would not really strengthen the world league by assuring its unanimous support by all American nations. These nations would naturally discuss beforehand the questions to come before the League and decide upon the attitude of all the American nations. Indeed it could easily and profitably develop into a kind of sub-committee of the committee of the whole, to consider purely American matters. By such a relationship the American nations could settle their own questions, but with the double advantage that

these smaller nations would have some final appeal in case of absolute injustice by the one American power that is easily able to impose its will on all the rest of the continent; also the cis-Atlantic nations would be enabled to have direct touch with the American nations in working toward the peace and prosperity of the world at large.

We are today in the midst of one of those great world epochs when all relations with and inheritances from the past are in flux. The best of the past must be readjusted, reformed, redefined to contribute to the future—the new day, which, whether, we like it or not, is different from the old.

The Monroe Doctrine has been the greatest influence on the American continent for preserving the republican form of government. It is today neither an "obsolete shibboleth" nor an "international impertinence", if understood in the original and true sense. There is no question that the Doctrine has been made to cover a multitude of sins, political and commercial, and is abused by North American jingoes. The wrong appeal to and interpretation of the Doctrine has developed among the Hispanic American peoples a prejudice against it, and among the statesmen of the south an insistent demand for a definition of its present application. If we can be big enough to put ourselves in the place of our southern neighbors we must acknowledge that they have a right to a clear understanding of how far the Doctrine means "America for the Americans" and how far it means "America for the North Americans". If we are to retain our leadership in America and in the world in this new age when the rights of the small nation and the common man are the concern of all and when a righteous peace in the world is the pearl of great price for which all else may be sacrificed, we will turn toward world friendship rather than shrivel into a Prussian nationalism.

And if we are honest, as we believe we are, in our contention that, as Secretary Root said, "We wish for no victories but those of peace, for no territory except our own", and as Roosevelt said, "This Doctrine has nothing to do with the commercial relations of any American powers save that it in truth allows

each of them to form such as it desires", and, as President Wilson said, "Let us have a common guarantee that all of us will sign, an agreement of political independence and territorial integrity"—if we really mean these things, let us make them so clear and so authoritative that our worst enemies cannot but admit that our relations with Hispanic America are guided, as John Hay said they were with China, by the open door and the golden rule, and that the Monroe Doctrine is the simple expression of our commitment to the principles of American democracy, developed without outside interference, and of our willingness to give the last drop of our blood for its defense.

SAMUEL GUY INMAN.